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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-EvIDENCE-COCONSPIRATORS Ex
CEPTION-INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE REQUIREMENT-Statements by
alleged coconspirators may be considered by trial court in its pre
liminary determination of admissibility of those statements-United
States v. Martorano, 557 F.2d 1, affd on rehearing, 561 F.2d 406
(1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U. S. L. W. 3579 (March 21, 1978).
Late in the summer of 1974 Peter Pallotta grew desperate for
cash to cover pressing debts from his nightclub operation in Re
vere, Massachusetts. His brother, Bugsy, arranged a meeting with
the defendant, James Martorano, at Martorano's Boston restaurant.
At that meeting Martorano agreed to lend Pallotta $2,000.00. The
interest was 5% per week. Payments were to be collected at Pallot
ta's nightclub every Friday night. Pallotta made a few sporadic
payments, but he soon fell behind as his nightclub operation
failed.! Finally, in November of 1974, Pallotta's fear of Martorano's
strong-arm collection tactics prompted him to seek FBI protective
custody in return for his services as a cooperating witness against
Martorano.
Between November 1974 and January 1975 Pallotta cooperated
with the FBI by making phone calls to Martorano, Brian Halloran
(Martorano's co-defendant),2 Jimmy Matera,3 and Frank Pagano. 4
During the conversations, Pagano and Matera made statements in
dicating that Pallotta could be in physical danger if he went to
Martorano's restaurant. These statements tended to show both that
Pallotta was the victim of extortion and that Martorano was in
volved in the scheme to extort.
The FBI monitored these calls and the prosecution used the
Matera-Pallotta and Pagano-Pallotta statements to convict Mar
1. Pallotta's problems went considerably beyond one delinquent loan. In a let
ter to his brother, Bugsy, Pallotta named his creditors as "Mario and Tony from Re
vere, Vinny the Pig, and Bobby, Joe Balliro, Whitey and Louie from South Boston,
and your friend Johnny." Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 16, United States v. Mar
torano, 557 F.2d 1, aird on rehearing, 561 F.2d 406 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46
U.S.L.W. 3579 (March 21, 1978).
2. Pallotta described Halloran as "a loan shark, collector and enforcer and a
madman." United States v. Martorano, 557 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1977). Halloran was ac
quitted on four counts of extortion. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, Sllpra note 1, at 5.
3. Matera was present at Martorano's restaurant when the loan was consum
mated. At that time he received instructions from Martorano regarding the Friday
night collections. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, Sllpra note 1, at 7.
4. According to Pallotta, Pagano had been Matera's loan sharking partner for
twenty years. ld. at 8.
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torano of four counts of extortion under the Consumer Credit Pro
tection Act. 5 These conversations were admitted into evidence
under the coconspirators exception to the hearsay rule,6 which
provides that a coconspirator's declaration in furtherance of the
conspiracy is competent evidence against all coconspirators. On ap
peal Martorano argued that the trial court erred in applying the
exception to the Pagano conversations. Specifically, he contended
that the prosecution's preliminary showing of conspiracy, which is a
precondition to applying the exception, was deficient.
In affirming the conviction, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit held that the trial court, in its preliminary evaluation of the
evidence showing a Martorano-Pagano conspiracy, properly consid
ered the contents of some of the monitored conversations. 7 In the
view of the appellate court these conversations,8 when considered
along with independent evidence of the conspiracy,9 formed a suf
ficient preliminary showing of conspiracy to permit these and other
Pagano-Pallotta conversations to be admitted into evidence against
Martorano under the coconspirators exception. Because the pur
pose of the preliminary evaluation was to determine the admissibil
ity of the Pagano hearsay statements under the exception, the
court's reliance on the content on some of the statements to make
5. 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-896 (1970). The indictment charged Martorano with two
counts of conspiracy and two substantive offenses (extortionate extension of credit
and collection by extortionate means). 18 U.S.C. § 892(a) (1970) provides: "Whoever
makes any extortionate extension of credit, or conspires to do so, shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 894(a)
(1970) provides:
Whoever knowingly participates in any way, or conspires to do so, in the use
of any extortionate means
(1) to collect or attempt to collect any extension of credit, or
(2) to punish any person for the nonrepayment thereof,
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more 20 years, or
both.
Matera and Pagano were also indicted on similar charges, but were tried separately.
Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 1, at 5.
6. "A statement is not hearsay if ... [tlhe statement is offered against a party
and is ... a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in further
ance of the conspiracy." FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
7. United States v. Martorano, 557 F.2d 1, 12, afI'd on rehearing, 561 F.2d 406
(1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3579 (March 21, 1978).
8. The specific conversations relied on by the court of appeals revealed that
Pagano and Matera had supplied to Martorano half the money he loaned to Pallotta.
Id. This fact conclusively links Pagano and Martorano in conspiracy, which allows all
the other Pagano statements into evidence against Martorano under the coconspirators
exception.
9. The court found the independent, nonhearsay evidence of Pagano's in
volvement "not terribly compelling." [d.
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out a preliminary showing resulted in the hearsay declarations
"bootstrapping" their way to the level of competent evidence. To
the extent that the court relied on the hearsay to establish its own
competence, it in effect abandoned the requirement of indepen
dent evidence.
This application of the coconspirators exception not only differs
markedly from the common law procedures,10 but also conflicts
with interpretations of the Federal Rules of Evidence forwarded by
the other circuits.l1 In these other circuits, as well as at common
law, a showing of conspiracy from evidence independent of the
hearsay sought to be admitted remains a prerequisite to admitting
coconspirator declarations.
The court of appeals tempered its unprecedented holding in
United States v. Martorano 12 in an opinion on rehearing, Mar
torano II.13 In the second opinion, the court ruled that certain
statements made by Pagano to Pallotta were admissible in their
own right as "verbal acts."14 These verbal acts could be considered
along with the other independent, nonhearsay evidence linking
Pagano and Martorano in conspiracy. Because the evidence con
sidered in the preliminary detennination was now characterized as
admissible, and hence prima facie reliable, the court found a suffi
cient preliminary showing of conspiracy without resorting to the
bootstrap procedures of Martorano 1. 15
The "verbal act" reasoning in Martorano II represented a sec
ond attempt to bring the statements in question within the bounds
of the traditional hearsay exception. However, even on rehearing,
10. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75 (1942), describes the traditional
requirement of independent evidence. In passing on the sufficiency of the evidence
convicting a former U.S. Attorney of fraud and corruption, the Court held: "However,
such declarations are admissible over the objections of an alleged co-conspirator,
who was not present when they were made, only if there is proof aliunde that he is
connected with the conspiracy .... Otherwise, hearsay would lift itself by its own
bootstraps to the level of competent evidence." rd. at 74-75 (citations omitted).
11. United States v. Holder, 560 F.2d 953, 956-57 (9th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Haynes, 560 F.2d 913, 915 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827,
835 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. McManus, 560 F.2d 747, 750 (6th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294, 1298-99 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v.
Savell, 546 F.2d 43, 46-47 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Trowery, 542 F.2d 623,
626-27 (3d Cir.), cen. denied, 429 U.S. 1104 (1976); United States v. Stroupe, 538
F.2d 1063, 1065-66 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 118
n.246 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cen. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2641 (1977).
12. 557 F.2d 1, aff'd on rehearing, 561 F.2d 406 (lst Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46
U.S.L.w. 3579 (March 21, 1978).
13. 561 F.2d 406 (lst Cir. 1977).
14. See text accompanying notes 42-47 infra.
15. 561 F.2d at 406-07.
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the court reaffirmed its initial reading of the Federal Rules, and
defended its reasons for allowing the bootstrap procedure. Both the
bootstrapping of Martorano I and the verbal act reasoning of Mar
torano II represent clear departures from the preliminary showing
required under the exception at common law.
The coconspirators exception at early common law grew out of
the rule, still in force today, which considered a party's out of court
admissions 16 to be competent evidence, even when introduced to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. Admissions are competent
evidence, not because they are inherently reliable, but rather be
cause a party to an adversary proceeding should be held respon
sible for her past statements. The party has the responsibility to
explain away the inconsistencies between the admission and the
position maintained at trial. 17
Admissions by a coconspirator were deemed competent evi
dence against a defendant because the declarant was said to be the
defendant's agent.18 The declarant's admission was imputed to the
defendant by the principle of respondeat superior. The term "vi
carious admission" aptly describes the exception in this early com
mon law form.
Agency principles no longer support the exception. 19 Rather,
the prosecution's great need for this evidence presently explains
the admissibility of coconspirator declarations. 2o The significance of

16. An admission is "anything said by the party-opponent . . . provided it
exhibits the quality of inconsistency with the facts now asserted by him in pleadings
or in testimony." 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1048, at 4 (Chadbourn rev. 1972) (em
phasis in original).
17. [The witness] is confronting the very person whose statements he is
reporting, he is subject to cross-examination by counsel who has at his
elbow the person who knows all the facts and circumstances of the alleged
statements and who is therefore in the best possible position to conduct a
searching inquiry, and, finally, the declarant may himself go upon the stand
and deny, qualify or explain the alleged admissions.
Morgan, Admissions as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 30 YALE L.J. 355, 361
(1921).
18. Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961, 967 (2d Cir. 1926), contains
Learned Hand's classic statement of the conspiracy-agency theory. "When men enter
into an agreement for an unlawful end, they become ad hoc agents for one another,
and have made a 'partnership in crime.' What one does pursuant to their common
purpose, all do, and, as declarations may be such acts, they are competent against
all." 13 F.2d at 967.
19. Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1159, 1165 (1954).
20. ld. at 1164; Note, Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72
HARV. L. REV. 920, 989 (1959).
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the new rationale is that, even though the rule remains in the same
form, the admissibility of coconspirator declarations can no longer be
justified on the basis of an "imputed admissions" theory. Instead,
the admissibility issue must be recast in terms of reliability. 21
Consequently, the modern coconspirators exception seeks to
separate reliable from unreliable coconspirator declarations. Courts
accomplish this separation by requiring that the three elements of
the exception be satisfied as a precondition to the admissibility of
coconspirator statements. These elements are that 1) the statement
must have been made during the conspiracy, 2) in furtherance of the
conspiracy, and 3) there must be independent evidence of the con
spiracy and the defendant's participation therein. 22 Under the mod
ern exception, the requirement of independent evidence serves to
demonstrate the reliability of the hearsay rather than to establish
an agency relationship.
Under Federal Rule 801(d)(2)(E)23 the coconspirators exception
remains substantially similar to the common law exception. The
federal rule omits express reference to the independent evidence
requirement, but impliedly retains the requirement by its use of
the word "conspirator. "24 Furthermore, the comments to the rule
21. Morgan, Rationale of Vicarious Admissions, 42 HARV. L. REV. 461, 463
(1929). The reliability of coconspirator declarations is questionable. The speaker may
be intentionally deceiving his audience, bragging, or sincerely misinformed. In order
to narrow the scope of this note, bona fide coconspirator declarations are presumed
reliable. The remaining problem is identifying a bona fide coconspirator declaration.
"In the absence of some special guarantee of reliability inherent in the cir
cumstances surrounding the making of such statements, their admission in criminal
cases presents a significant danger of misguided convictions." Davenport, The Con
frontation Clause and the Co-conspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions: A
Functional Analysis, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1378, 1378 (1972).
22. E.g., United States v. Lambros, 564 F.2d 26, 29-30 (8th Cir. 1977).
23. See note 6 supra.
24. This language is designed to deal with two conditions which in the
Uniform Rules are stated separately. The first Uniform Rule condition,
which the unpublished comments of the Advisory Committee indicate was
intended to be expressed in R~le 801 "without difference in meaning," is
that "the party and the declanint were participating in a plan to commit a
crime or civil wrong." The significance of this condition is that there must
be evidence independent of the hearsay establishing a defendant's participa
tion in the conspiracy before such declarations are admissible against him.
4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE ~ 801(d)(2)(E)(01) at 801-148
(footnotes omitted). United States v. Dixon, 562 F.2d 1138 (9th Cir. 1977), expressly
supports this view. "In the present case, the relevant prerequisites to admission of
[coconspirator statements] are embodied in the word 'coconspirator': The govern
ment must show by evidence independent of the statement (1) that a conspiracy
existed and (2) that [defendant] was a member of it." 562 F.2d at 1141.
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cite the Califomia25 and New Jersey26 versions of the exception as
being comparable to the federal rule. Independent evidence of
conspiracy is required in both states. 27
Although the substantive content of the exception remains as it
was at common law, the Federal Rules provide a different
mechanism for applying the exception. Prior to the adoption of the
Federal Rules, the jury evaluated the preliminary independent
showing of conspiracy. Only if the jury was convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt,28 from evidence independent of the hearsay, that
a conspiracy existed between the declarant and the defendant, was
it permitted to consider the hearsay against the defendant. Jurors,
however, were often unwilling or unable to ignore the hearsay in
25. CALIF. EVID. CODE § 1223 (West 1966) provides:
ADMISSION OF CO-CONSPIRATOR. Evidence of a statement offered against a
party is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if:
(a) The statement was made by the declarant while participating in a
conspiracy to commit a crime or civil wrong and in furtherance of the
objective of that conspiracy;
(b) The statement was made prior to or during the time that the party
was participating in that conspiracy; and
(c) The evidence is offered either after admission of evidence sufficient
to sustain a finding of the facts specified in subdivisions (a) and (b) or, in
the court's discretion as to the order of proof, subject to the admission of
such evidence.
26. N.]. R. EVID. 63(9) provides:
VICARIOUS ADMISSIONS. A statement which would be admissible if made by
the declarant at the hearing is admissible against a party if ... (b) at the
time the statement was made the party and the declarant were participating
in a plan to commit a crime or civil wrong and the statement was made in
furtherance of that plan.
27. The New Jersey statute more closely resembles the Federal Rule in that it
contains no express requirement of independent evidence. In State v. Benevento,
138 N.J. Super. 211, 350 A.2d 485 (App. Div. 1975), cer!. denied, 70 N.J. 276, 359
A.2d 488 (1976), the court interpreted the provision as implicitly including the re
quirement:
It is clear that in a conspiracy case a statement by one conspirator is admis
sible against another conspirator if made in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Since there was proof aliunde of the complicity of [defendant] as a con
spirator the out-of-court statement of Benevento was properly admitted. See
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1941).
Id. at 217, 350 A.2d at 488, (citations omitted).
28. The practical limitations of the jury favor using the severe "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard:
The jury is already concerned with the evidence-weighing standards in
volved in proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To expect them not only to
compartmentalize the evidence ... , but as well to apply to the independent
evidence the entirely different evidence-weighing standards required of a
prima facie case, is to expect the impossible.
Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 737 (9th Cir. 1963).
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making the preliminary determination. 29 Furthermore, the identity
of the preliminary and ultimate issues often made the exercise
seem futile. 30 As a result of these problems, the common law
method allowing the jury to decide the preliminary issue was inef
fective. Jurors' confusion often caused them to forgo the prelimi
nary determination entirely.
Federal Rule 104,31 which deals with preliminary questions of
admissibility, remedies the weakness of the common law method
by reallocating the responsibility for making the preliminary de
termination to the trial judge. 32 This reallocation, however, creates
serious new difficulties. 33 Martorano 1 spotlights the most impor

29. The Supreme Court noted the heavy burden that application of the
coconspirators exception placed on jurors in Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604,
619 (1953).
30. "The declarations are admissible against the defendants if they are co
conspirators. If they are co-conspirators they are guilty." Carbo v. United States, 314
F.2d 718, 736 (9th Cir. 1963). Where substantive crimes are charged in addition to a
conspiracy count, the limiting instruction may have some effect. The less congruous
the preliminary and ultimate issues are, the more likely the jurors will perceive the
nature of the two separate tasks. See 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FED
ERAL EVIDENCE § 33 (1977).
31. FED. R. EVID. 104 provides in part:
(a) QUESTIONS OF ADMISSIBILITY GENERALLY. Preliminary questions con
cerning ... the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court,
subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination it
is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.
(b) RELEVANCY CONDITIONED ON FACT. When the relevancy of evidence
depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it
upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a find
ing of the fulfillment of the condition.
32. FED. R. EVID. 104(a). See note 31 supra. Overtones of conditional relevance
are often superimposed on the preliminary evaluation in conspiracy cases. Prelimi
nary questions of conditional relevance remain jury questions under FED. R. EVID.
100(b). However, when applying the coconspirators exception, the issue is more
properly framed as a question of admissibility for the judge under rule 100(a). See
Advisory Committee's Notes to rule 104(b); 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note
30, § 26; 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 24, ~ 104(05); 21 C. WRIGHT &
K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, §§ 5053, 5055 (1977). But see
Kessler, The Treatment of Preliminary Issues of Fact in Conspiracy Litigation: Put
ting the Conspiracy Back into the Conspirator Rule, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77 (1976).
33. One problem with the new approach is that it does not specify the strength
of the preliminary showing needed to justify application of the exception. One view
suggests that the preliminary proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt. 1 J. WEIN
STEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 24, ~ 104(05). This standard protects defendants.
However, since such protection is not constitutionally required, see, e.g., United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 (1974), and places a heavy burden on the prosecu
tion, most courts use a lower standard. No consensus exists among the circuits re
garding the proper preliminary standard. E.g., United States v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d
1294, 1299 nA (2d Cir. 1977). The circuits even disagree as to the relative severity of
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tant new difficulty and clearly illustrates the potential magnitude of
the modification.
The most dramatic problem raised by allowing the judge alone
to determine the sufficiency of the evidence comprising the pre
liminary showing is that it becomes unclear which types of evidence
he or she may consider. Rule 104(a) provides: "In making its [the
court's] determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence ex
cept those with respect to privileges." In Martorano I & II, the
First Circuit interpreted this language as allowing the preliminary
determination to be based on inadmissible evidence, including
hearsay and perhaps the very statement to be admitted. The court
reasoned that, because the trial judge is sensitive to the weakness
es of hearsay, he or she is capable of assessing its proper weight in
making a preliminary determination. Furthermore, the court per
ceived no difference between hearsay in general and a coconspira
tor's hearsay statement. 34 Therefore, the judge may consider the
statement seeking admittance, along with other hearsay and inde
pendent evidence, when making a preliminary determination re
garding conspiracy.
Although easing the independent evidence requirement 35 ini
tially appears to be a reasonable result under the Federal Rules, a
more comprehensive examination of the rules and the policies they
embody reveals the result to be unwarranted. The arguments favor
ing retention of the independent evidence requirement range from
statutory construction of the Federal Rules themselves, to sixth
amendment constitutional limitations.
Working within the Federal Rules, the abrogation of the inde
pendent evidence requirement must fail for two reasons. First, it
conflicts with the implied retention of the requirement in rule
801(d)(2)(E).36 Second, the provision of rule 104(a) freeing the

the standards they use. Compare Stanchich, with United States v. Trotter, 529 F.2d
806,811-12 (3d Cir. 1976) and United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20,23 (1st Cir.
1977). In Petrozziello the First Circuit held that the reallocation requires a higher
standard of proof than the common law method because the defendant no longer
enjoys the safeguards of a jury decision on the preliminary determination. ld. at 23.
34. "It seems that, once hearsay is placed before the district court, it would be a
matter of indifference to the criminal defendant what its source is." 561 F.2d at 408.
35. The court maintained that "under any view of the law we would, as we said
in our original opinion, require Significant independent evidence of the existence of
the conspiracy . . . ." ld. at 408. However, "significant independent evidence" is
simply too amorphous a standard to review. Once the preliminary evaluation is
tainted with bootstrap evidence, the independent quality is destroyed.
36. See note 24 supra.
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judge from the rules of evidence should be viewed as a permissive
feature rather than an affirmative mandate. 37 Since it is an overall
procedural feature, the rule should complement, not supplant, sub
stantive principles of law. 38 Since the coconspirators exception
represents the union of hearsay and conspiracy law, it should be
doubly resistant to this modification.
The abrogation of the independent evidence requirement also
threatens the fundamental safeguards provided by the Constitution.
Ultimately, all hearsay exceptions in criminal cases must satisfy
basic reliability requirements 39 inherent in the sixth amendment
right to confrontation. 4o As modified by the approach in Martorano
I, the coconspirators exception lacks the assurances of reliability
provided by the independent evidence requirement. 41 The deter
37. The last sentence of the rule is not an open invitation to ignore the
rules of evidence. Rather, it calls for good sense to suit the needs of speed
and convenience at the trial. In many instances the evidence considered by
the court wiII also have to be considered by the jury-as for example in de
termining the existence and membership of a conspiracy for admission of
conconspirator's hearsay . . . . Since, in such cases, the court must decide
whether a reasonable jury could decide for the proponent it makes sense on
the preliminary determination only to consider the same evidence the jury
will have before it~i.e., admissible evidence.
1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 24, ~ 104(02) at 104-25.
38. See 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 32, at § 5053, where rule 104 is
characterized as a "residual rule" and a "fall-back position." The authors emphasize
that this rule should not aIter substantive law. Two examples given where the rule
should defer to substantive law are the parol evidence nile and the principle of
agency law whereby the out-of-court statements of an agent are not admissible to
prove the agent's authority. The analogy between agency and conspiracy is clear.
The substance of the coconspirators exception should control here instead of the
procedural provision of rule 104.
39. In Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972), the Supreme Court concisely
restated its interpretation of the confrontation clause:
The focus of the Court's concern has been to insure that there "are indicia of
reliability which have been widely viewed as determinative of whether a
statement may be placed before the jury though there is no confrontation of
the declarant," . . . and to "afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for
evaluating the truth of the prior statement," .... It is clear ... from numer
ous prior decisions of this Court, that even though the witness be unavail
able his prior testimony must bear some of these "indicia of reliability," re
ferred to in DlittOIl.
408 U.S. at 213 (citations omitted) (quoting, respectively, Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74
(1970), and California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970)).
40. The sixth amendment provides in part that "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him
...." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
41. 'The extent to which the reliability of the hearsay at issue is guaranteed
depends on the reliability and probative value of the independent evidence actually
presented." Davenport, supra note 21, at 1389.
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mination that the statement was uttered during a conspiracy must
precede any reliance on the content of the statement because the
reliability of the content is directly derived from its origins in con
spiracy.42 Conspiracy is the raison d'etre of the exception. Without
a preliminary independent showing of conspiracy, statements of an
alleged coconspirator have insufficient indicia of reliability to justify
the absence of actual confrontation in open court.
While the Martorano I approach might yield an objectively
correct result in any given case, the procedure lacks the stability
and dependability that are indispensable to evidence law in the
criminal setting. The specific defect of Martorano I is that it fails to
exclude Frank Pagano's statements from James Martorano's trial; its
broader defect is that the procedure it announces provides no
means by which to distinguish the statements of a Frank Pagano
from those of a Walter Mitty.
Perhaps after considering the extent to which its initial holding
departed from settled principles of evidence in conspiracy cases,
the court attempted to muffie the ramifications of Martorano I in
its opinion on rehearing. Martorano II reiterated the validity of the
approach in the earlier opinion, but sought alternative grounds on
which to affirm the conviction. Since upholding the conviction de
pended upon the proper application of the coconspirators exception,
the court needed an alternative method of satisfying the indepen
dent evidence requirement.
To satisfy this requirement the court resorted to the amor
phous notion of "verbal acts. "43 Verbal acts, as used by the court in
Martorano II, are statements that inferentially indicate the declar
42. The quandary can be symbolized:
Let A= a coefficient of reliability,
x= the content of the coconspirator's statement, and
y= independent evidence.
Admissibility of x turns on the value of A. The court determines the value of A by
evaluating the preliminary showing of conspiracy. The probative value, Q, of the
coconspirator's statement is a function of A such that
Q = Ax.
The traditional application of the exception is illustrated as
A = y, + Y2 + Ya + ... Yn'
If the value of A exceeded the preliminary standard, Q was used on the ultimate
issue of defendant's guilt. But the Martorano I approach applies the exception as
A = y, + Y 2 + Y 3 + ... Y n + Q.
Since Q is a function of A, substituting for Q in the Martorano I equation yields an
infinite circle.
43. "[Tlhe phrase 'verbal act' ... is less vague than res gestae only because it
is couched in English, instead of Latin." Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Ut

terances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31

YALE

L.J. 229, 235 (1922).
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ant's state of mind. 44 Since they are not offered to prove the trutI\
of the matter asserted, they are admissible as nonhearsay. The
evidentiary significance of a verbal act lies not in the correctness of
its assertion, but rather in the bare fact that the statement was
made. The utterance allows an inference about the speaker's state
of mind. This inference need not be tested by cross-examination
because it is not dependent on the memory, perception, or narra
tion of the speaker. 45
The court applied this principle to· certain Pagano statements
which indicated his complicity in the Pallotta loan. As verbal acts,
these statements were admissible "in their own right."46 The court
considered these newly admissible statements along with other in
dependent evidence linking Pagano and Martorano in conspiracy.
It concluded that this evidence constituted a sufficient independent
showing of conspiracy, as required by the traditional form of the
exception. 47
Because the initial use of Pagano's statements as "verbal acts"
is properly limited to showing his state of mind, close analysis
reveals a logical flaw in the use of these statements in the inde
pendent preliminary showing of conspiracy at Martorano's trial.
Dubbing the statements "verbal acts" does not cure any possible
objective unreliability in Pagano's statements. Verbal act theory al
lows those statements to inform the factfinder only of Pagano's then
existing state of mind. It does no more; the permissible use of the
statement has been narrowed to the point at which hearsay objec
tions do not come into play. The statements, used as "verbal acts,"
cannot tell us whether Pagano is a competent reporter of any ex
ternal facts. To learn whether these facts exist as reported, one
must test the accuracy of his belief by cross-examination.
Consequently, the broadest permissible inference from Paga
no's statements is that Pagano thought he was a coconspirator with
Martorano. The reasoning process must stop with that inference.
To continue on to the next logical step, that there actually was a
conspiracy, is to infer from Pagano's state of mind the truth of the
external reality that allegedly ~ave rise to his state of mind. This
44. 561 F.2d at 407. The court cites 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 16, at § 1790
entitled "Utterances as indicating circumstantially the speaker's own state of mind."
45. This list omits sincerity, the fourth potential infirmity of hearsay, because
it affects the validity of the inference. If, for example, the speaker is joking, the
inference of her state of mind will be inaccurate. See Morgan, The Hearsay Rule, 12
WASH. L. REv. 1,6 (1937).
46. 561 F.2d at 407.

47.

Id.
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inference of course depends on the accuracy of his belief. The
hearsay rule forbids the final inference 48 because its validity de
pends on the memory, perception, and narration of the out-of-court
speaker, Pagano.
Rather than forge an opinion based on fundamental hearsay
principles, the court cited United States v. Calarco 49 as precedent
for its proposition that the verbal acts of an alleged coconspirator
are properly considered in the independent showing of conspiracy
against the nondeclarant co-defendant. In Calarco, two defen
dants, Calarco and Riviello, were accused of hijacking a truck. The
government's witness testified that after defendant Calarco spoke in
private with Riviello (the nondeclarant co-defendant, analogous to
Martorano in the principal case), Calarco said to the other con
spirators, "This is where you are going to bring the truck. "50 The
court characterized this statement as a verbal act and considered it
as independent evidence on the preliminary issue of Riviello's par
ticipation in the conspiracy. In the court's view, the statement was
a reliable indication that Riviello had given an instruction that was
relayed to the other conspirators.
Although the Calarco court did not specifY exactly which
branch of the verbal act concept51 it used, the usage approximates
that of the First Circuit in Martorano II. The apparent reasoning of
Calarco includes an impermissible inference similar to the one in
Martorano II. Calarco's conduct inferentially indicated his belief

48. "It is only when the statement is offered as the basis for the inferences,
first, that the declarant believed it, and, second, that the facts were in accordance
with his belief, that the evidence is said to be hearsay." C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 250 (2d ed. 1972) (emphasis in original). An approximation of the
reasoning in Martorano II is the rule from Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S.
285 (1892). Though Hillman involved an express declaration of intention, rather than
an indirect expression as in Martorana II, the reasoning is instructive. In Hillman, a
third person's letter declaring an intention to leave Wichita with Hillmon was admit
ted into evidence to prove that Hillmon had left Wichita with the writer. The infer
ence from the writer's stated belief, that he would leave with Hillmon, to the reality
underlying that belief, the subsequent conduct, -is permissible under the Hillman
rule. That rule, however, has been strictly limited to proving subsequent conduct. An
extension of the Hillman rule to include past conduct "would amount to allowing the
exception for declarations of mental state to swallow substantially the entire hearsay
rule." C. MCCORMICK, supra, § 296 (footnote omitted).
49. 424 F.2d 657 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
50. Id. at 660 n.1.
51. Wigmore divides the concept into three branches: 1) Utterances forming a
part of the issue (operative facts); 2) Utterances forming a verbal part of an act; and
3) Utterances used as circumstantial evidence. 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 16,
§§ 1766-1792.
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that he was a cog in the hijacking plan. This belief is relevant to
the determination of Calarco's participation, but it clearly cannot
implicate Riviello. To implicate Riviello, a further inference is
necessary, specifically, that Calarco's belief in the existence of a
plan to bring the truck to a certain location reflected reality. This
inference is only warranted if we trust the memory, perception,
narration, and sincerity of the out-of-court speaker and is therefore
prohibited by the hearsay rule. 52 The imprecise reasoning of
Calarco is uncritically relied upon in Martorano II. The misuse of
the verbal acts concept in Calarco and Martorano II short-circuits
the traditional independent evidence requirement and leaves the
evidence admitted on the strength of that preliminary showing
without sufficient assurances of reliability.
In the end we are left with two approaches that convert
Pagano's hearsay into competent evidence that supports a criminal
conviction. 53 The first approach, bootstrapping, extends the pro
cedural provisions of rule l04(a) to the point at which that rule
collides with the well-established substantive provisions of rule
801(d)(2)(E), the coconspirators exception. Surprisingly, in this col
lision, the substantive provisions yield, and the court is allowed to
consider nonindependent evidence in its preliminary determina
tion. The alternative "verbal acts" approach attempts to satisfY the
independent evidence requirement by treating statements that are
properly restricted to indicating a declarant's state of mind as hard
evidence of the involvement of others in a conspiracy.
Both approaches concededly led the court to a plausible re
sult in the instant case. The Pagano statements, when considered
against the background circumstances, evoke an intuitive feeling of
credibility and suggest that the conviction in the principal case may
well have been proper. The problem is that in our system of pro
cedural safeguards, intuition should not be allowed to support a
conviction. Martorano has set an unfortunate precedent. Its proce
dures represent a unique version of the coconspirators exception, a
version stripped of its most effective means of assuring the relia
bility of pivotal hearsay statements-the independent evidence
requirement.

Paul R. McCary
52. See note 44 supra.
53. Martorano was sentenced to ten years imprisonment and fined $10,000.00.
Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 1, at 3.

